Ilhan Inan's (2012) approach to curiosity is based on the following central theses: (i) for every question asked out of curiosity there is a corresponding term (defi nite description) that is inostensible for the asker (its reference is unknown) and that has the function of uniquely identifying an object; (ii) the satisfaction of curiosity is always in the form of coming to know an object as falling under a concept. This model primarily covers curiosity as our search for empirical objectual knowledge. In my critical refl ections, I explore some phenomena of non-objectual curiosity which are left out or at least not suffi ciently explored by Inan: curiosity as the search for explanation and understanding, and meta-curiosity - curiosity about the very representations, i. e. how to conceptualize a certain problem, and what definite descriptions to use in the first place.
COBISS.SI-ID: 22980872
The paper discusses Sosa's view of intuitional knowledge and raises the question of the nature of reflective justification of intuitional beliefs. It is assumed, in agreement with Sosa, that pieces of belief of good researchers are typically reflectively justified, in addition to being immediately, first-level justified. Sosa has convincingly argued that reflective justification typically mobilizes and indeed should mobilize capacities distinct from the original capacity that has produced the belief-candidate for being justified, in order to assess the reliability of the original capacity. It has to go beyond justifiers that are of the same-kind ("homogeneous") as first-level immediate ones, in order to enlarge the circle of justification (and thus avoid viciousness), and is, therefore, holistic and coherentist. But if this holds, it seems that reflective justification of armchair beliefs, presumably produced by intuition and some reasoning, should revert to empirical considerations testifying to the reliability of intuition and reasoning. Therefore, it typically combines, in an articulated way, a posteriori elements contributing to the thinker's reflective trust in her armchair capacities. In short, the paper argues that Sosa's own view of second-order justification goes better with a more aposteriorist view, if it does not even force such a view.
COBISS.SI-ID: 22021896
Using the results of the latest neurophysiological research on colour, the article rejects outright physicalism and dispositionalism as appropriate approaches to solving the problem of colour realism. Physicalism sees colour as a real property of objects, i. e. the reflectance profile, while dispositionalism takes subjects, objects and light as necessary elements for colour production. First, it briefly outlines the historical development of the theory of colour, pointing towards dispositionalism which, in some sense, considers colour as a real entity of the world, and then introduces the problem of colour realism, focusing on objections to physicalism as well as dispositionalism. After delineating the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the visual experience of colour, and with the help of the concrete results of practical neurophysiological experiments, the article points to why the physicalist and any dispositionalist theories of colour in the light of a new physiological objection do not present credible views on the nature of colour.
COBISS.SI-ID: 512600376