The monograph takes the psychoanalytic (Freudian and Lacanian) notion of sexuality, as related to the unconscious, to be a properly philosophical, ontological problem of psychoanalysis. It argues that sexuality is the point of a “short circuit” between ontology and epistemology. Sexuality and knowledge are structured around a fundamental ontological negativity or minus, which unites them at the point of the unconscious. The work explores the further consequences of this configuration, including its implications for a possible realist ontology, which, however, cannot bypass the concept of the subject. The monograph is being translated into six languages.
COBISS.SI-ID: 42082605
This article sets out from the thesis according to which the crucial issue in Kant’s “Copernican turn” in philosophy is thought’s affection by a “thing” that while belonging to thought evades its grasp. This thesis is supported by two central issues of Kant’s philosophy. The first issue is ontological, i.e. Kant’s “transcendental difference” between phenomenon and noumenon. The second is logico-epistemological; at it core is the self-critique of reason or the critique of the transcendental appearance, such as it is developed in the transcendental dialectics of the first Critique. Although these two issues converge in terms of problems and concepts, it is only in his Critique of Judgement that Kant succeeded in properly articulating their connection. It is this effect of connection that is grounded in the completion of the transcendental aesthetic through the sensibility of feeling as well as the logical operations of the reflective judgement that we call the additional, second “Copernican turn” of Kant’s philosophy that concludes Kant’s revolution in thinking and at the same time solves the problem of thought’s affection by its “thing”.
COBISS.SI-ID: 40856621
Freud’s letters to Wilhelm Fliess are commonly considered to be a collection of ideas that fill the conceptual gap between Studies On Hysteria and The Interpretation of Dreams, thus enabling the transition to psychoanalysis proper to be grasped. Following this line of thought, the article subsequently argues for a stronger thesis, i.e. that the correspondence with Fliess set the conditions for the emergence of what Freud calls metapsychology – the unique speculative attempt at providing the psychical apparatus with a construction of its own auto-reflexion. In Freud, metapsychology is not reducible to either the psychology of the unconscious or to the strictly impossible psychology of the drives; its object is rather what evades them both.
COBISS.SI-ID: 64591970
The text attempts to expose some parallels between the theoretical projects of Deleuze and Lacan. Despite many parallels, however, there is a fundamental difference that stems from the fact that Deleuze together with Guattari in Anti-Oedipus cut Lacan’s theory into two halves (objet petit a and the big Other) and in that manner chose to go in the opposite direction from Lacan. It seems that in that way in general – despite some passages which prove to be exceptions to this general trend – he avoids what Lacan calls the “encounter with the real” which occurs for Lacan precisely as the “impossible” that happens”. This is most clearly visible in Deleuze’s critique of psychoanalysis, the unconscious, and Lacan’s conceptualisation of the real, which for late Lacan is the real without law. Here the text underlines the unexpected proximity of Jacques-Alain Miller’s recent text on the real in the 21st century to Deleuze. Finally, through a critique of Miller, another perspective on Lacan’s “law that changes” is suggested.
COBISS.SI-ID: 40711213
The monograph A-cogito is principally a study on the ontological status of the Cartesian cogito. The first part of the book consists of a systematic comparison of Descartes’ cogito to the so-called “anticipations” of the cogito argument in St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. What renders this investigation especially difficult is the fact that Descartes and Augustine not only share common ground – consisting of a proof of the irrefutability of our existence – but the two philosophies also coincide as two representatives of ontological dualism. In the second part of the book another question is set at the forefront: Is it conceivable that another crucial “anticipation” of the cogito exists? Namely, the self-consciousness of madness, such as it is represented in various art forms of the Northen Renaissance. On the basis of an analysis of Renaissance artworks, the monograph then attempts to extrapolate an argument which can be arguably regarded as an ontological proof of stupidity. The last part of the book consists of a theory of the grotesque, which relates to contemporary biopolitical theory.
COBISS.SI-ID: 287929600