Rewarding cooperation is in many ways expected behaviour from social players. However, strategies that promote antisocial behaviour are also surprisingly common, not just in human societies, but also among eusocial insects and bacteria. Examples include sanctioning of individuals who behave prosocially, or rewarding of free-riders who do not contribute to collective enterprises.We therefore study the public goods game with antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding in order to determine the potential negative consequences on the effectiveness of positive incentives to promote cooperation. Contrary to a naive expectation, we show that the ability of defectors to distribute rewards to their like does not deter public cooperation as long as cooperators are able to do the same. Even in the presence of antisocial rewarding, the spatial selection for cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas is enhanced. Since the administration of rewards to either strategy requires a considerable degree of aggregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial contributions as well as the corresponding rewards. Defectors when aggregated, on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial rewards, but due to their lack of contributions to the public good they ultimately succumb to their inherent inability to secure a sustainable future. Strategies that facilitate the aggregation of akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behaviour, thus always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.
COBISS.SI-ID: 21604360
Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.
COBISS.SI-ID: 21772552
Through research we wanted to establish how EU integration process influenced the area of local self-government in selected EU member states and if we witness also the unification of this aspect among EU member states. Results confirm that convergence really occurred and that EU member countries are converging to the commonly adopted criteria are principles as stated in EU charter of local self-government
COBISS.SI-ID: 12005148
Emigration of highly educated population can represent a major loss of human capital for the country of origin. On the other hand returning migrants can positively contribute to economic development and growth in their home country due to their wide international and multicultiral experiences, educational level and foreign point of view. Usually, countries are not aware of the potential of returning migrants and do not encourage them return. Since, the administrative procedures could be the barrier for return, we present legal environment in Slovenia, which return migrants have to deal with, focusing on legal conditions for their personal and professional reintegration in socio-economic life. Taking into account the potential the returning migrant bring to the national economy, it is also crucial to analyze the state’s measures to provide support in establishing renewed professional and personal life.
COBISS.SI-ID: 12179996
The paper researches the sub-prime and global crisis origins of the Eurozone sovereign crisis. We place the analysis of the European financial crisis in the context of both previous crises and find some striking similarities. The reasons leading up to the crisis were different for each country, but some of the factors were common: lax credit standards, property bubble funded by banks, highly exposed banking sector, contagion impacts through the financial market channel and through a generalized increase in global economic risk aversion. We suggest that the solution is not to add regulation, but to get rid of practices that come from being able to dump private loses on the public balance sheet.
COBISS.SI-ID: 12003868