The paper discusses Lehrer's pioneering approach to the topic of wisdom. His pithy proposal, that wisdom is preference of merit justified by an evaluation system and undefeated by error, fits well within the grand philosophical tradition of thinking about wisdom, offering a very clear and original formulation of its target. The first part of the paper puts it on a map of philosophical options concerning wisdom (anthropo-, theo- and cosmo-centric ones) and then raises questions about it: does preference have to motivate, what is the relation between factual and evaluative knowledge in the evaluation system, and how is the objectivity of merit secured? The second part briefly develops an alternative proposal inspired by Lehrers work. It is a two-level picture. Wisdom combines the virtues of the first-order production of decision and action (reliability and practical validity) with second-order reflective endorsement of the first-order picture. The first-order production yields phronesis-generated action-guiding desires which constitute practical wisdom in the narrow sense, and the second level the more refined and sophisticated wisdom of philosophers and their kin.
COBISS.SI-ID: 19577352
The consequence argument of van Inwagen is widely regarded as the best argument for incompatibilism. Lewis's response is praised by van Inwagen as the best compatibilist's strategy but Lewis himself acknowledges that his strategy resembles that of Lehrer. A comparison will show that one can speak about Lehrer-Lewis strategy, although I think that Lewis's variation is dialectically slightly stronger. The paper provides a response to some standard objections of incompatibilists to the Lehrer-Lewis reply.
COBISS.SI-ID: 19134984
The article critically polemizes with the book Braintrust by Patricia Churchland, which cites the latest results of neurophysiological research and interprets them in combination with evolutionary biology, experimental psychology, and genetics. It points out that Churchland seems satisfied with the claim that moral properties are (via social properties) natural (neurobiological) properties, because she does not specify in what sense the former are the latter. The identification of moral and natural properties could be, namely, explained in, at least, two ways: (i) in terms of strict identity, where moral properties are nothing ‘over and above’ neurobiological properties, which provides a reductive basis for morality, i.e. the links between morality and neurobiology are reductive and a moral vocabulary only a shortcut in our communication, and (ii) in terms of loose identity, where moral properties are merely dependent on natural properties in the sense of supervenience, which, however, allows morality to preserve its status of being a genuine entity.
COBISS.SI-ID: 19596808
The paper proposes a general account of the structure and stages of typical political TEs, largely analogous to the structure of TEs in other domains. It takes into account historical considerations, discussing the two dominant families of political TEs in the history of Western political thought, first, the Platonic tradition of ideal states, out of which arguably derives the tradition of utopian thinking continuing in literary fiction as well as in philosophical and narrowly political writing. It then passes to the other family of political TEs, i.e. the social contract tradition. It turns out that literary anti-utopias typically deploy crucial philosophical ideas traditionally typical of the social contact tradition in their criticism of their traditional positive counterparts. The concluding discussion combines a historical sketch and a topical-conceptual discussion for and against political TEs, arguing in their favor against the critical tradition from Aristotle to present day.
COBISS.SI-ID: 19402760
In the first section the paper explains how The Posterior Analytics relates to other logical works in Aristotle and especially to The Prior Analytics. A comparative analysis of episteme is done in the second section, concerning the notion of episteme in The Metaphysics. Aristotle already in its first sentence succinctly tells us that knowledge/understanding is something that is given to all men by nature in a way that leads to their aspiration; episteme will not be described only as a kind of information, which is resulting from the procedure of demonstration, but is also conceptualized as the science through its types or different forms. As a special type of science the concept of metaphysics is offered, or the philosophy as such: Aristotle also establishes a standard distinction between the empirical path of knowledge and scientific knowledge. In The Posterior Analytics the notion of episteme tackles the problem in a slightly different way. As a starting point we can take the role of apriori knowledge in the scientific process, which is discussed in the third section, where such knowledge serves as the first intuitive principle in scientific process of demonstration. In the fourth section some key concepts for understanding of both Analytics are introduced, including the syllogistic as a theory of logical argument. As we know it today, »syllogism« is not an adequate translation for what Aristotle meant by syllogismos, since the term is originally much wider and includes not only certain forms of valid arguments. What conditions must be met for scientific understanding is described in the fifth section – e.g. it must relate to facts that it can't be different; furthermore, it must offer an explanation that allows us to understand it. The paper then follows into the discussion of different kinds of scientific questioning from the beginning the second book of The Posterior Analytics. At the end there is a brief overview of the reception of the work in ancient, medieval and late commentators or translators.
COBISS.SI-ID: 19730440