The problem of the governance of economic transactions arises from the fact that they are sequential. This creates uncertainty regarding the fulfilment of implicit or explicit contracts. Institutional economics understands this uncertainty as arising from opportunism and seeks a solution in specialised contract enforcement institutions. Economic sociology understands the uncertainty as a result of misunderstanding and finds a solution in mechanisms of governance that, in addition to sanctions, allow for coordination among participants in a transaction. In this paper, we confront the arguments made by sociology and economics regarding the mechanism of governance of economic transactions. Following Polanyi, we distinguish three governance mechanisms of economic relations and note that, to be operational, each of them requires a different social structure and social regulation.
COBISS.SI-ID: 31785053
This paper attempts to clarify the concept of relational work for understanding economic life as proposed by Viviana Zelizer. To do so, it first compares the concept to similar notions used in other disciplinary fields. Second, it reinterprets some exemplary economic sociology studies by using the relational work lens to clarify the concept's utility for empirical analysis. Third, it speculates about the place of relational work in the theoretical toolkit of economic sociologists, in particular its relation to embeddedness. The paper concludes by arguing for the utility of the concept to integrate structural, cultural, and power-focused analyses of economic life, to highlight the often-overlooked role of emotions in economic exchange, and to ground an alternative to rational action theory in economic sociology.
COBISS.SI-ID: 512753265
Trust is very important for the working of economic markets because it promotes economic transactions. Trust in economic relations cannot be established in a society where people routinely behave in an opportunistic way, which in the long term undermines economic growth. In order to understand the dynamics of the production of trust in a society with initially low levels of social trust, we distinguish between two different types of trust: predictive trust which builds on a specific constellation of interests, and altruistic trust which implies universalistic morality. We illustrate the theoretical argument with the help of historical cases from the early modern period of the development of a market society. We conclude the article by discussing the possibilities for the transition from a low to high trust equilibrium society, with reference to the two types of trust.
COBISS.SI-ID: 31784541